Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria

Paulo Barelli

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 67, issue 2, 363-375

Abstract: A consistency condition (action-consistency) on the interim beliefs of players in a game is introduced. Action-consistency is weaker than common priors and, unlike common priors, is characterized by a "no-bets" condition on verifiable events. Using action-consistency, we provide epistemic conditions to Nash and correlated equilibria weakening the common knowledge restrictions in Aumann and Brandenburger [Aumann, R., Brandenburger, A., 1995. Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium. Econometrica 63, 1161-1180] and Aumann [Aumann, R., 1987. Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality. Econometrica 55, 1-18].

Keywords: Common; prior; assumption; Universal; beliefs; space; Epistemic; conditions; for; equilibria; Common; knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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