Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: A case study of public goods

Anabela Botelho, Glenn Harrison, Ligia Pinto and Elisabet Rutstrom

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 67, issue 1, 253-265.e3

Abstract: Game theory provides predictions of behavior in many one-shot games. On the other hand, most experimenters usually play repeated games with subjects, to provide experience. To avoid subjects rationally employing strategies that are appropriate for the repeated game, experimenters typically employ a "random strangers" design in which subjects are randomly paired with others in the session. There is some chance that subjects will meet in multiple rounds, but it is claimed that this chance is so small that subjects will behave as if they are in a one-shot environment. We present evidence from public goods experiments that this claim is not always true.

Keywords: Game; theory; Experiments; Public; goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (59)

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Working Paper: Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: a case study of public goods (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:1:p:253-265.e3

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