Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: a case study of public goods
Glenn Harrison (),
Ligia Pinto and
No 29, NIMA Working Papers from Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada (NIMA), Universidade do Minho
Game theory provides predictions of behavior in many one-shot games. On the other hand, most experimenters usually play repeated games with subjects, to provide experience. To avoid subjects rationally employing strategies that are appropriate for the repeated game, experimenters typically employ a "random strangers" design in which subjects are randomly paired with others in the session. There is some chance that subjects will meet in multiple rounds, but it is claimed that this chance is so small that subjects will behave as if they are in a one-shot environment. We present evidence from public goods experiments that this claim is not always true.
Keywords: Game theory; experiments; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pbe
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/publications/NIMAwp29.pdf full text (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: A case study of public goods (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nim:nimawp:29/2005
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
NIMA, EEG - Universidade do Minho, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal
The price is free.
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NIMA Working Papers from Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada (NIMA), Universidade do Minho NIMA, EEG - Universidade do Minho, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by NIMA ().