Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 81, issue C, 2013

Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects pp. 1-10

Özgün Ekici

The price of imperfect competition for a spanning network pp. 11-26

Herve Moulin and Rodrigo Velez

Aggregate comparative statics pp. 27-49

Daron Acemoglu and Martin Jensen

Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior pp. 50-68

Aviad Heifetz, Martin Meier and Burkhard Schipper

Beyond fictitious play beliefs: Incorporating pattern recognition and similarity matching pp. 69-85

Leonidas Spiliopoulos

Endogenous institutions and political extremism pp. 86-100

Alexander Wolitzky

A detail-free mediator pp. 101-115

Péter Vida and Helmuts Azacis

Multi-item Vickrey–English–Dutch auctions pp. 116-129

Tommy Andersson and Albin Erlanson

Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games pp. 130-144

Yakov Babichenko

Shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services: Guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money-burning options pp. 145-164

Adrian Beck, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Jianying Qiu and Matthias Sutter

Absorbing sets in roommate problems pp. 165-178

Elena Inarra, C. Larrea and Elena Molis

Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence pp. 179-191

Ehud Lehrer, Dinah Rosenberg and Eran Shmaya

Information and learning in oligopoly: An experiment pp. 192-214

Maria Bigoni and Margherita Fort

Nonparametric learning rules from bandit experiments: The eyes have it! pp. 215-231

Yingyao Hu, Yutaka Kayaba and Matthew Shum

First- and second-order subjective expectations in strategic decision-making: Experimental evidence pp. 232-254

Charles Manski and Claudia Neri

The fog of fraud – Mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity pp. 255-275

Matthias Lang and Achim Wambach

Volume 80, issue C, 2013

An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games pp. 1-9

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

Reinforcement learning in population games pp. 10-38

Ratul Lahkar and Robert M. Seymour

Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection pp. 39-67

Gabriel E. Kreindler and H. Young

Promises and conventions – An approach to pre-play agreements pp. 68-84

Topi Miettinen

On the investment implications of bankruptcy laws pp. 85-99

Özgür Kıbrıs and Arzu Kıbrıs

A dynamic school choice model pp. 100-114

Juan Pereyra

Cognitive ability and strategic sophistication pp. 115-130

Jeffrey Carpenter, Michael Graham and Jesse Wolf

Biased social learning pp. 131-146

Helios Herrera and Johannes Hörner

The e-mail game phenomenon pp. 147-156

Yi-Chun Chen and Siyang Xiong

Renegotiation-proof relational contracts pp. 157-178

Susanne Goldlücke and Sebastian Kranz

The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models pp. 179-185

Yuichiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima

Conservative belief and rationality pp. 186-192

Joseph Halpern and Rafael Pass

Competition for procurement shares pp. 193-208

Jose Alcalde and Matthias Dahm

Harmful signaling in matching markets pp. 209-218

Alexey Kushnir

Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points pp. 219-228

Peter Sudhölter and José Zarzuelo

Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good pp. 229-242

Gergely Csapó and Rudolf Müller

Pricing in social networks pp. 243-261

Francis Bloch and Nicolas Querou

Volume 79, issue C, 2013

Dynamics in tree formation games pp. 1-29

E. Arcaute, K. Dyagilev, R. Johari and S. Mannor

Network design and defence pp. 30-43

Marcin Dziubiński and Sanjeev Goyal

Shunning uncertainty: The neglect of learning opportunities pp. 44-55

Stefan Trautmann and Richard Zeckhauser

Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences pp. 56-66

Penelope Hernandez, Manuel Munoz and Ángel Sánchez

Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata pp. 67-74

Luciano Andreozzi

Social comparisons and reference group formation: Some experimental evidence pp. 75-89

Ian McDonald, Nikos Nikiforakis, Nilss Olekalns and Hugh Sibly

Auctions with entry and resale pp. 92-105

Xiaoshu Xu, Dan Levin and Lixin Ye

Sources of variation in social networks pp. 106-131

Enghin Atalay

The value of recommendations pp. 132-147

Jeanine Miklós-Thal and Heiner Schumacher

Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching pp. 148-162

Javier Rivas

Existence of equilibria in countable games: An algebraic approach pp. 163-180

Valerio Capraro and Marco Scarsini

Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information pp. 181-191

Andrew McGee and Huanxing Yang

Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information pp. 192-200

Dov Samet

Information sharing between vertical hierarchies pp. 201-222

Salvatore Piccolo and Marco Pagnozzi

Eureka Learning: Heuristics and response time in perfect information games pp. 223-232

C. Nicholas McKinney and John van Huyck

Volume 78, issue C, 2013

Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding pp. 1-20

Matthew Pearson and Burkhard Schipper

The informational divide pp. 21-30

Manfred Nermuth, Giacomo Pasini, Paolo Pin and Simon Weidenholzer

A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals pp. 31-43

Giacomo Bonanno

How to win a large election pp. 44-63

Michael Mandler

A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment pp. 64-71

Francoise Forges

Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition pp. 72-84

Rene Saran and Norovsambuu Tumennasan

Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality pp. 85-102

Patrick Hummel

Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information pp. 103-120

Nicolas Jacquemet and Frederic Koessler