Anonymous social influence

Manuel Förster, Michel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Manuel Foerster

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 82, issue C, 621-635

Abstract: We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have “yes” or “no” inclinations on some issue, and opinions may change due to mutual influence among the agents. Each agent independently aggregates the opinions of the other agents and possibly herself. We study influence processes modeled by ordered weighted averaging operators, which are anonymous: they only depend on how many agents share an opinion. For instance, this allows to study situations where the influence process is based on majorities, which are not covered by the classical approach of weighted averaging aggregation. We find a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence to consensus and characterize outcomes where the society ends up polarized. Our results can also be used to understand more general situations, where ordered weighted averages are only used to some extent. Furthermore, we apply our results to fuzzy linguistic quantifiers, i.e., expressions like “most” or “at least a few”.

Keywords: Influence; Anonymity; Ordered weighted averaging operator; Convergence; Consensus; Fuzzy linguistic quantifier (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (47)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Anonymous Social Influence (2013)
Working Paper: Anonymous social influence (2013)
Working Paper: Anonymous social influence (2013)
Working Paper: Anonymous Social Influence (2013)
Working Paper: Anonymous social influence (2013)
Working Paper: Anonymous social influence (2013)
Working Paper: Anonymous social influence (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:621-635

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.006

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