Stability and trembles in extensive-form games

Yuval Heller

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 84, issue C, 132-136

Abstract: A leading solution concept in the evolutionary study of extensive-form games is Selten (1983) notion of limit ESS. This note demonstrates that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that it may be dynamically unstable (almost any small perturbation takes the population away). These problems arise due to an implicit assumption that “mutants” are arbitrarily rare relative to “trembling” incumbents. Finally, I present a novel definition that solves this issue and has appealing properties.

Keywords: Limit ESS; Evolutionary stability; Extensive-form games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Stability and trembles in extensive-form games (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:84:y:2014:i:c:p:132-136

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.011

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