EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Stability and trembles in extensive-form games

Yuval Heller

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A leading solution concept in the evolutionary study of extensive-form games is Selten's (1983) (selten1983evolutionary) notion of limit ESS. We demonstrate that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that it may be dynamically unstable (almost any small perturbation takes the population away). These problems arise due to an implicit assumption that “mutants” are arbitrarily rare relative to “trembling” incumbents. Finally, we present a novel definition that solves this issue and has appealing properties.

Keywords: Limit ESS; evolutionary stability; extensive-form games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48160/1/MPRA_paper_48160.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50345/1/MPRA_paper_50345.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50350/1/MPRA_paper_50350.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51052/1/MPRA_paper_51052.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53387/1/MPRA_paper_53387.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Stability and trembles in extensive-form games (2014) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:48160

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:48160