Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium

Christian Bach and Elias Tsakas

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 85, issue C, 48-59

Abstract: We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundation for Nash equilibrium in terms of pairwise epistemic conditions locally imposed on only some pairs of players. Our main result considerably weakens not only the standard sufficient conditions by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), but also the subsequent generalization by Barelli (2009). Surprisingly, our conditions do not require nor imply mutual belief in rationality.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Pairwise common belief; Pairwise mutual belief; Pairwise action-consistency; Rationality; Conjectures; Biconnected graph; Epistemic game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:85:y:2014:i:c:p:48-59

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.017

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