On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games
Johannes Hörner,
Satoru Takahashi and
Nicolas Vieille ()
Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 85, issue C, 70-83
Abstract:
This paper provides a dual characterization of the existing ones for the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in a class of finite stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg et al. (1994), Kandori and Matsushima (1998) and Hörner et al. (2011) obtain. As a second corollary, it is shown that this limit set of payoffs is a convex polytope when attention is restricted to perfect public equilibria in pure strategies. This result fails for mixed strategies, even when attention is restricted to two-player repeated games.
Keywords: Stochastic games; Repeated games; Folk theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:85:y:2014:i:c:p:70-83
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.010
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