Strategic complexity in repeated extensive games

Nozomu Muto

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 83, issue C, 45-52

Abstract: This paper studies a machine (finite automaton) playing a two-player repeated game of a simple extensive-form game with perfect information. We introduce a new complexity measure called multiple complexity which incorporates a strategyʼs responsiveness to information in the stage game as well as the number of states of the machine. We completely characterize the Nash equilibrium of the machine game. In the sequential-move prisonerʼs dilemma, cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium.

Keywords: Strategic complexity; Finite automaton; Repeated game; Extensive game; Prisonerʼs dilemma; Multiple complexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:83:y:2014:i:c:p:45-52

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.007

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