Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences

Ruben Juarez ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 82, issue C, 218-239

Abstract: Every agent reports his willingness to pay for one unit of a good. A mechanism allocates goods and cost shares to some agents. We characterize the group strategyproof (GSP) mechanisms under two alternative continuity conditions interpreted as tie-breaking rules. With the maximalist rule (MAX) an indifferent agent is always served. With the minimalist rule (MIN) an indifferent agent does not get a unit of the good.

Keywords: Cost sharing; Mechanism design; Group strategyproof; Tie-breaking rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Working Paper: Group Strategyproof Cost Sharing: The Role of Indifferences (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:218-239

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.005

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