Group Strategyproof Cost Sharing: The Role of Indifferences

Ruben Juarez ()

No 201202, Working Papers from University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics

Abstract: Every agent reports his willingness to pay for one unit of good. A mechanism allocates goods and cost shares to some agents. We characterize the group strategyproof (GSP) mechanisms under two alternative continuity conditions interpreted as tie-breaking rules. With the maximalist rule (MAX) an indi erent agent is always served. With the minimalist rule (MIN) an indi erent agent does not get a unit of good. GSP and MAX characterize the cross-monotonic mechanisms. These mechanisms are appropriate whenever symmetry is required. On the other hand, GSP andMIN characterize the sequential mechanisms. These mechanisms are appropriate whenever there is scarcity of the good. Our results are independent of an underlying cost function; they unify and strengthen earlier results for particular classes of cost functions.

Keywords: Cost sharing; Mechanism design; Group strategyproof; Tie-breaking rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2012-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_12-2.pdf First version, 2012 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences (2013)
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