First-best collusion without communication

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 83, issue C, 224-230

Abstract: I study a 2-bidder infinitely repeated IPV first-price auction without transfers, communication, or public randomization, where each bidderʼs valuation can assume, in each of the (statistically independent) stage games, one of three possible values. Under certain distributional assumptions, the following holds: for every ϵ>0 there is a nondegenerate interval Δ(ϵ)⊂(0,1), such that if the biddersʼ discount factor belongs to Δ(ϵ), then there exists a Perfect Public Equilibrium with payoffs ϵ-close to the first-best payoffs.

Keywords: Auctions; Collusion; Repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D43 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:83:y:2014:i:c:p:224-230

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.007

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