Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces

Elnaz Bajoori, János Flesch and Dries Vermeulen

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 82, issue C, 490-502

Abstract: Simon and Stinchcombe distinguish two approaches to perfect equilibrium, the “trembling hand” approach, and the “finitistic” approach, for games with compact action spaces and continuous payoffs. We investigate relations between the different types of perfect equilibrium introduced by Simon and Stinchcombe. We also propose an improved version of the finitistic approach, and prove existence.

Keywords: Strategic form games; Perfect equilibrium; Compact action spaces (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:490-502

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.002

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