Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare

Paula Jaramillo, Cagatay Kayi and Flip Klijn

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 82, issue C, 693-701

Abstract: We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.

Keywords: Many-to-one matching; Deferred acceptance; Nash equilibrium; Dropping strategies; Filled positions; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare (2015)
Working Paper: Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare (2013)
Working Paper: Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:693-701

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001

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