Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 69, issue 2, 2010

Present-bias, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and fixed costs pp. 205-223

Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin and Andrew Schotter

On obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree problems pp. 224-237

Gustavo Bergantiños and Anirban Kar

Sharing a minimal cost spanning tree: Beyond the Folk solution pp. 238-248

Anna Bogomolnaia and Herve Moulin

Altruism and social integration pp. 249-257

Pablo Brañas-Garza, Ramon Cobo-Reyes, Maria Paz Espinosa, Natalia Jiménez, Jaromír Kovářík and Giovanni Ponti

Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs pp. 258-273

Xiaoyong Cao and Guoqiang Tian

Gaining power through enlargement: Strategic foundations and experimental evidence pp. 274-292

Michalis Drouvelis, Maria Montero and Martin Sefton

Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives pp. 293-301

Robert Dur and Joeri Sol

Manipulation via capacities revisited pp. 302-311

Lars Ehlers

Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion pp. 312-328

Florian Englmaier and Achim Wambach

Minority voting and long-term decisions pp. 329-345

Theresa Fahrenberger and Hans Gersbach

Fairness and desert in tournaments pp. 346-364

David Gill and Rebecca Stone

Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences pp. 365-393

Hanna Halaburda

Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol pp. 394-400

Yuval Heller

Flexible network rules for identified externalities pp. 401-410

Noemí Navarro

Status quo bias, multiple priors and uncertainty aversion pp. 411-424

Pietro Ortoleva

House allocation with existing tenants: A characterization pp. 425-445

Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver

Leadership games with convex strategy sets pp. 446-457

Bernhard von Stengel and Shmuel Zamir

Why income comparison is rational pp. 458-474

David H. Wolpert

The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments pp. 475-491

Özgür Yılmaz

Costly network formation and regular equilibria pp. 492-497

Francesco De Sinopoli and Carlos Pimienta

A theory of hung juries and informative voting pp. 498-502

Fuhito Kojima and Yuki Takagi

Too much investment? A problem of endogenous outside options pp. 503-511

David de Meza and Ben Lockwood

Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games pp. 512-516

Bernhard von Stengel

Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano, Voting and Collective Decision Making: Bargaining and Power, Cambridge University Press (2008) 184 pages pp. 517-522

William S. Zwicker

Volume 69, issue 1, 2010

A celebration of Robert Aumann's achievements on the occasion of his 80th birthday pp. 1-1

Pradeep Dubey, Eric Maskin and Yair Tauman

Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents pp. 2-23

Robert M. Anderson, Glenn Ellison and Drew Fudenberg

Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: Theory and data pp. 24-41

James Anton, Sandro Brusco and Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo

Price dynamics on a stock market with asymmetric information pp. 42-71

Bernard De Meyer

Grading exams: 100,99,98,... or A,B,C? pp. 72-94

Pradeep Dubey and John Geanakoplos

Ability and knowledge pp. 95-106

Olivier Gossner

How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures pp. 107-126

Sergiu Hart and Yishay Mansour

A commitment folk theorem pp. 127-137

Adam Tauman Kalai, Ehud Kalai, Ehud Lehrer and Dov Samet

Simple collusive agreements in one-shot first-price auctions pp. 138-149

Gil Kivetz and Yair Tauman

The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) pp. 150-164

Jinpeng Ma

Complexity and effective prediction pp. 165-168

Abraham Neyman and Joel Spencer

Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case pp. 169-174

Dov Samet

The relationship between quantum and classical correlation in games pp. 175-183

Adam Brandenburger

All-stage strong correlated equilibrium pp. 184-188

Yuval Heller

A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions pp. 189-193

Anirban Kar, Indrajit Ray and Roberto Serrano

On the accessibility of the core pp. 194-199

Yi-You Yang

Volume 68, issue 2, 2010

The logit-response dynamics pp. 413-427

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Nick Netzer

Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages pp. 428-442

Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson and Zaifu Yang

Preference reversals: The impact of truth-revealing monetary incentives pp. 443-468

Joyce E. Berg, John Dickhaut and Thomas A. Rietz

Peace agreements without commitment pp. 469-487

Carmen Bevia and Luis Corchon

Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: An experimental study pp. 488-511

Andreas Blume and Uri Gneezy

On effectivity functions of game forms pp. 512-531

Endre Boros, Khaled Elbassioni, Vladimir Gurvich and Kazuhisa Makino

Clock games: Theory and experiments pp. 532-550

Markus Brunnermeier and John Morgan

On the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment: New experimental evidence regarding Linda pp. 551-556

Gary Charness, Edi Karni and Dan Levin

Multi-object auctions with package bidding: An experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA pp. 557-579

Yan Chen and Kan Takeuchi

Sharing information in Web communities pp. 580-601

Gabrielle Demange

Partial exposure in large games pp. 602-613

Ronen Gradwohl and Omer Reingold

Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior pp. 614-625

Emily C. Haisley and Roberto Weber

The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure pp. 626-633

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Gerard van der Laan, Adolphus Talman and Zaifu Yang

Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions - How (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field pp. 634-645

Andreas Lange and Anmol Ratan

Optimal collusion with internal contracting pp. 646-669

Gea M. Lee

Signaling and mediation in games with common interests pp. 670-682

Ehud Lehrer, Dinah Rosenberg and Eran Shmaya

Simple complexity from imitation games pp. 683-688

Andrew McLennan and Rabee Tourky

Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good experiments pp. 689-702

Nikos Nikiforakis

Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents pp. 703-715

Sérgio O. Parreiras and Anna Rubinchik

Meaningful learning and transfer of learning in games played repeatedly without feedback pp. 716-730

Scott Rick and Roberto Weber

Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests pp. 731-747

Roman Sheremeta

Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information pp. 748-762

Artyom Shneyerov and Chi Leung Wong

On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle pp. 763-772

Juan Carlos Carbajal

Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching pp. 773-780

Scott Kominers

The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships pp. 781-788

Imran Rasul and Silvia Sonderegger

Games and science pp. 789-792

Aviad Heifetz

Volume 68, issue 1, 2010

A sequential selection game with vetoes pp. 1-14

Steve Alpern, Shmuel Gal and Eilon Solan

Simple games with many effective voters pp. 15-22

Eyal Beigman

Pre-match investment with frictions pp. 23-34

Chris Bidner

Secure implementation in allotment economies pp. 35-49

Olivier Bochet and Toyotaka Sakai

Discrimination in the lab: Does information trump appearance? pp. 50-59

Marco Castillo and Ragan Petrie

Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply - experimental evidence pp. 60-76

Damian Damianov, Jörg Oechssler and Johannes Gerd Becker

On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium pp. 77-94

Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Diego Moreno and Benyamin Shitovitz

Testing guilt aversion pp. 95-107

Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson, Sigve Tjøtta and Gaute Torsvik

When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs? pp. 108-129

Amanda Friedenberg

Perception of probabilities in situations of risk: A case based approach pp. 130-143

Gabrielle Gayer

Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information pp. 144-154

Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu

Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability pp. 155-179

Joseph Halpern

Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust pp. 180-191

Florian Herold

Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly pp. 192-207

Maarten Janssen and Santanu Roy

Risk aversion and expected utility of consumption over time pp. 208-219

Olof Johansson-Stenman

Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems pp. 220-232

Cagatay Kayi and Eve Ramaekers

Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic rules pp. 233-241

Özgür Kıbrıs and Ipek Gursel Tapki

Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies pp. 242-254

Chongmin Kim and Kam-Chau Wong

Moral norms in a partly compliant society pp. 255-274

Sebastian Kranz

Sharing the cost of a public good: An incentive-constrained axiomatic approach pp. 275-302

Francois Maniquet and Yves Sprumont

Fictitious play in an evolutionary environment pp. 303-324

Michal Ramsza and Robert M. Seymour

Truth and trust in communication: Experiments on the effect of a competitive context pp. 325-338

Julian Rode

Attribution and reciprocity pp. 339-352

Alexander Sebald

Public information and electoral bias pp. 353-375

Curtis R. Taylor and Huseyin Yildirim

On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard pp. 376-380

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenael Piaser and Uday Rajan

Polytopes and the existence of approximate equilibria in discontinuous games pp. 381-388

Guilherme Carmona

Universality of the Epstein-Wang type structure pp. 389-402

Yi-Chun Chen

The possibility of impossible stairways: Tail events and countable player sets pp. 403-410

Mark Voorneveld

Behavioral & Quantitative Game Theory Conference on Future Directions May 14-16, 2010, Fairmont Hotel, Newport Beach, CA pp. 411-411

Moshe Dror and Greys Sosic