The insider's curse

Angel Hernando-Veciana () and Michael Tröge

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 71, issue 2, 339-350

Abstract: The paper shows that in an open-ascending bid auction with multi-dimensional uncertainty about private and common value components, private information about the common value has negative value for a bidder if there are sufficiently many bidders. We discuss the role of the visibility of bids and the multi-dimensionality of private information for this result.

Keywords: Auctions; Asymmetric; information; Information; disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: THE INSIDER'S CURSE (2005)
Working Paper: The Insider's Curse (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:339-350

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