Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games

Vincent Anesi

Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 70, issue 2, 488-493

Abstract: This short note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in voting games. To do so, we study stationary Markov equilibria (SMEs) of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games. The following result emerges from such an exercise: Every stable set of the underlying simple game is the limit set of pure strategy, stage-undominated SMEs of the bargaining game when voters are sufficiently farsighted.

Keywords: Legislative; bargaining; Committee; Stationary; Markov; equilibrium; Stable; set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (53)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games (2009)
Working Paper: Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:2:p:488-493

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