Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games

Vincent Anesi

No 551, RCER Working Papers from University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER)

Abstract: This note investigates the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vN-M) stable sets in voting games. To do so, we study subgame perfect equilibria of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games. The following results emerge from such an exercise: Every stable set of the underlying simple game is the limit set of undominated pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibria, and of strategically stable sets of undominated subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining game with farsighted voters.

Keywords: Legislative bargaining; committee; strategic stability; stable set. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games (2010)
Working Paper: Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:roc:rocher:551

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