Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects

Ran Eilat and Ady Pauzner

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 71, issue 2, 503-512

Abstract: We study a private-values buyer-seller problem with multiple objects. Valuations are binary and i.i.d. We construct mechanisms that span the set of all Pareto-efficient outcomes. The induced trading rules for objects are linked in a simple way.

Keywords: Bilateral; trade; Multiple; objects; Buyer-seller; problem; Bargaining; Mechanism; design; Private; values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:503-512

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