Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies

Yusuke Kamishiro

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 71, issue 2, 513-520

Abstract: In this paper we show that in quasilinear economies the incentive compatible coarse core is non-empty if agents are informationally small in the sense of McLean and Postlewaite (2002) and the strict core in each state is non-empty.

Keywords: Informational; size; Incentive; compatibility; Coarse; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899-8256(10)00091-6
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:513-520

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().