Information feedback in a dynamic tournament

Masaki Aoyagi

Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 70, issue 2, 242-260

Abstract: This paper studies the problem of information revelation in a multi-stage tournament where the agents' effort in each stage gives rise to a stochastic performance signal privately observed by the principal. The principal controls the agents' effort incentive through the use of a feedback policy, which transforms his private information into a public announcement. The optimal feedback policy is one that maximizes the agents' expected effort. The paper identifies when the principal should use the no-feedback policy that reveals no information, or the full-feedback policy that reveals all his information.

Keywords: Interim; performance; evaluation; Tournament; Mechanism; Information; revelation; Jensen's; inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (84)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Information Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:2:p:242-260

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