Information Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament

Masaki Aoyagi

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: This paper studies the problem of information revelation in a multi-stage tournament where the agents' effort in each stage gives rise to a stochastic performance signal privately observed by the principal. The principal controls the agents' effort incentive through the use of a feedback policy, which transforms his private information into a public announcement. The optimal feedback policy is one that maximizes the agents' expected effort. The paper identifies when the principal should use the no-feedback policy that reveals no information, or the full-feedback policy that reveals all his information.

Date: 2003-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2003/DP0580.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Information feedback in a dynamic tournament (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0580

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Librarian ().