Robust implementation in general mechanisms

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 71, issue 2, 261-281

Abstract: A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces.

Keywords: Mechanism; design; Implementation; Robustness; Common; knowledge; Interim; equilibrium; Dominant; strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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Related works:
Chapter: Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms (2012)
Working Paper: Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms (2010)
Working Paper: Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms (2010)
Working Paper: Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms (2008)
Working Paper: Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms (2008)
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