Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

No 1666R, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Implementation; Robustness; Common knowledge; Interim equilibrium; Dominant strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2008-06, Revised 2010-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (2011), 71: 261-281

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Related works:
Chapter: Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms (2012)
Journal Article: Robust implementation in general mechanisms (2011)
Working Paper: Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms (2010)
Working Paper: Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms (2008)
Working Paper: Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms (2008)
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