Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
Maria Montero () and
Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 71, issue 2, 395-408
We study a majoritarian bargaining model in which players make payoff demands in decreasing order of voting weight. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is such that the minimal winning coalition of the players that move first forms with payoffs proportional to the voting weights. This result advances previous analysis in terms of one or more of the following: a) the simplicity of the extensive form (finite horizon with a predetermined order of moves); b) the range of the majority games covered; c) the equilibrium concept (subgame perfect equilibrium is sufficient for a unique prediction).
Keywords: Demand; bargaining; Coalition; formation; Weighted; majority; games; Minimal; winning; coalitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:395-408
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