Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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Minimum-Effort Coordination Games: Stochastic Potential and Logit Equilibrium pp. 177-199: Simon Anderson, Jacob Goeree and Charles Holt
Evolution and Mixed Strategies pp. 200-226: Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson
Stability and Largeness of the Core pp. 227-237: Amit K. Biswas, T. Parthasarathy and G. Ravindran
Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior in Israel, Japan, Slovenia, and the United States: A Social Utility Analysis pp. 238-269: Miguel Costa-Gomes and Klaus Zauner
On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality Games pp. 270-286: Francesco De Sinopoli
Private Value Allocations in Large Economies with Differential Information pp. 287-311: Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz
Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games pp. 312-330: Jack Robles
A Dynamic Model of Network Formation pp. 331-341: Alison Watts
On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games pp. 342-363: John Wooders and Jason Shachat

Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty pp. 1-10: Walter Bossert and Hans Peters
An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play pp. 11-33: James Cox, Jason Shachat and Mark Walker
Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games pp. 34-63: Hans Jorgen Jacobsen, Mogens Jensen and Birgitte Sloth
Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object pp. 64-82: Bettina Klaus
Job Matching and Coalition Formation with Utility or Disutility of Co-workers pp. 83-103: Jinpeng Ma
Predicting How People Play Games: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice pp. 104-122: Rajiv Sarin and Farshid Vahid
Zermelo and the Early History of Game Theory pp. 123-137: Ulrich Schwalbe and Paul Walker
Cyclic Games: An Introduction and Some Examples pp. 138-152: Reinhard Selten and Myrna Wooders
A One-Stage Model of Link Formation and Payoff Division pp. 153-175: Marco Slikker and Anne van den Nouweland

Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Side-Payments pp. 159-176: Sandeep Baliga and Robert Evans
Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test Of Aumann's Conjecture pp. 177-194: Gary Charness
Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A Comment on De Fraja (1999) pp. 195-205: Yeon-Koo Che
On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings pp. 206-230: Kim-Sau Chung
Partial Pooling at the Reserve Price in Auctions with Resale Opportunities pp. 231-248: Philip Haile
The Choquet Bargaining Solutions pp. 249-264: Efe Ok and Lin Zhou
A Sealed-Bid Auction That Matches the English Auction pp. 265-273: Motty Perry, Elmar Wolfstetter and Shmuel Zamir
On the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Random Games pp. 274-293: Yosef Rinott and Marco Scarsini
Incentive Mechanism Design for Production Economies with Both Private and Public Ownerships pp. 294-320: Guoqiang Tian

An Evolutionary Model of Bertrand Oligopoly pp. 1-19: Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Ana Ania and Klaus Schenk-Hoppé
A Model of Stability and Persistence in a Democracy pp. 20-40: Angelo Artale and Hans Peter Gruner
Chess-like Games Are Dominance Solvable in at Most Two Steps pp. 41-47: Christian Ewerhart
Asymmetric Price-Benefits Auctions pp. 48-71: Maria-Angeles de Frutos
Specialization of Labor and the Distribution of Income pp. 72-89: Akihiko Matsui and Andrew Postlewaite
An Experiment on the Hypothesis of Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining pp. 90-116: Axel Ockenfels and Reinhard Selten
Privately Observed Time Horizons in Repeated Games pp. 117-125: Régis Renault
Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules pp. 126-144: Yves Sprumont
In Defense of Lawyers: Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation pp. 145-158: Karl Wärneryd

Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Principled-Player Approach pp. 157-182: Alvaro Sandroni
Subgame Monotonicity in Extensive Form Evolutionary Games pp. 183-205: R. Cressman
Is a Unique Cournot Equilibrium Locally Stable? pp. 206-218: Krishnendu Dastidar
The 17th Arne Ryde Symposium, "Focal Points--Coordination, Complexity, and Communication in Strategic Contexts" pp. 219-219: Fredrik Andersson, Hans Carlsson and Hakan Holm
Variable-Frame Level-n Theory pp. 220-246: Michael Bacharach and Dale Stahl
Egalitarianism and Efficiency in Repeated Symmetric Games pp. 247-262: V Bhaskar
Focal Points in Framed Strategic Forms pp. 263-291: Andre Casajus
Gender-Based Focal Points pp. 292-314: Hakan Holm
Strategic Similarity and Emergent Conventions: Evidence from Similar Stag Hunt Games pp. 315-337: Frederick W. Rankin, John van Huyck and Raymond Battalio

Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games pp. 1-24: Abhijit Banerjee and Jörgen Weibull
Adaptive Learning and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games: An ARCH(1) Approach pp. 25-50: Bruno Broseta
Characterizations of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Excludable versus Nonexcludable Public Projects pp. 51-66: Shinji Ohseto
The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel for NTU Games pp. 67-84: Gooni Orshan and José Zarzuelo
Stability of Equilibria in Games with Procedurally Rational Players pp. 85-104: Rajiv Sethi
Rule Learning in Symmetric Normal-Form Games: Theory and Evidence pp. 105-138: Dale Stahl
Characterization of the Owen Set of Linear Production Processes pp. 139-156: J. R. G. van Gellekom, J. A. M. Potters, Hans Reijnierse, M. C. Engel and S. H. Tijs