Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Commitment and observability in games pp. 271-280: Kyle Bagwell
Protective behavior in matching models pp. 281-296: Salvador Barberà and Bhaskar Dutta
On the dominance solvability of large cournot games pp. 297-321: Tilman Börgers and Maarten Janssen
Vertigo: Comparing structural models of imperfect behavior in experimental games pp. 322-348: Mahmoud El-Gamal and Thomas Palfrey
Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy pp. 349-363: Andrew N. Ermolov
Cooperation in a one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma pp. 364-377: Joseph Harrington
Two examples of strategic equilibrium pp. 378-388: Jean-François Mertens
On axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values pp. 389-405: Andrzej Nowak and T. Radzik
"Impossibility of speculation" theorems with noisy information pp. 406-423: Doron Sonsino
A note on non-essential players in multi-choice cooperative games pp. 424-432: Chih-Ru Hsiao

Editor's note pp. 1-2: Ehud Kalai
Nobel symposium on game theory: Rationality and equilibrium in strategic interaction pp. 3-5: Brian Skyrms
Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality pp. 6-19: Robert Aumann
Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria pp. 20-55: Drew Fudenberg and David Kreps
Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game pp. 56-90: John Gale, Kenneth G. Binmore and Larry Samuelson
A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information pp. 91-122: John Harsanyi
Subjective games and equilibria pp. 123-163: Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer
Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term pp. 164-212: Alvin Roth and Ido Erev
An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives pp. 213-263: Reinhard Selten
The 50th anniversary of TGEB pp. 264-268: William Lucas

The Value of Large Extensive Form Games pp. 309-317: Jacques Crémer
Bottom-Fishing and Declining Prices in Sequential Auctions pp. 318-331: Gale Ian L. and Hausch Donald B.
Learning, Tracing, and Risk Dominance pp. 332-345: Hendon Ebbe, Jacobsen Hans Jorgen, Nielsen Michael Teit and Birgitte Sloth
Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games pp. 346-380: Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, Shachat Keith and Smith Vernon
Computable Strategies for Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma pp. 381-389: Vicki Knoblauch
Finitely Many Players with Bounded Recall in Infinitely Repeated Games pp. 390-405: Ehud Lehrer
Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games pp. 406-427: Leininger Wolfgang and Yang Chun-Lei
Cooperative Outcomes through Noncooperative Games pp. 428-440: David Perez-Castrillo
Ratio-Lindahl and Ratio Equilibria with Many Goods pp. 441-460: Guoqiang Tian and Qi Li
On the Interpretation of Nonsymmetric Bargaining Solutions and Their Extension to Nonexpected Utility Preferences pp. 461-472: Federico Valenciano and José Zarzuelo
Set-Valued Analysis, Systems & Control Series, Vol. 2. By Jean-Paul Aubin and Helene Frankowska, Birkhauser, Boston, 1990 pp. 473-475: Nowakowska-Rozploch Danuta

Option Values and Bargaining Delays pp. 139-153: Avery Christopher and Zemsky Peter B.
Money Burning and Multiple Equilibria in Bargaining pp. 154-168: Avery Christopher and Zemsky Peter B.
Bargaining and Commitment in a Permanent Relationship pp. 169-176: Steinar Holden
A Condition for the Existence of a Nash Equilibrium in Games with Public and Private Objectives pp. 177-192: Nikolai Kukushkin
Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions pp. 193-220: Marshall Robert C., Meurer Michael J., Jean-Francois Richard and Stromquist Walter
Zero-Sum Average Payoff Stochastic Games with General State Space pp. 221-232: Andrzej Nowak
An Informationally Robust Equilibrium for Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Games pp. 233-245: Arthur Robson
Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Known-Own Payoffs pp. 246-259: Jonathan Shalev
Cooperation in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Perturbations pp. 260-285: Joel Watson
Equilibrium in Non-partitioning Strategies pp. 286-294: Robert Weber
The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice pp. 295-300: Lin Zhou
Sharkey's Example pp. 301-307: Telser Lester C.

Group Rationality, Utilitarianism, and Escher's Waterfall pp. 1-9: Kaushik Basu
Evolutionary Equilibria Resistant to Mutation pp. 10-34: Boylan Richard T.
A Study on Decomposable Convex Games pp. 35-38: Chang Chih and Kan Ching-Yu
Equilibrium Cooperation in Three-Person, Choice-of-Partner Games pp. 39-53: Douglas Davis and Charles Holt
A Simple Noncooperative Core Story pp. 54-61: Roger Lagunoff
Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game pp. 62-91: Dilip Mookherjee and Barry Sopher
Some Refinements of Nash Equilibria of Large Games pp. 92-103: Kali Rath
Understanding When Agents Are Fairmen or Gamesmen pp. 104-115: Spiegel Matthew, Janet Currie, Hugo Sonnenschein and Arunava Sen
Organizations as Teams of Automata pp. 116-138: Stephen Turnbull