Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Volume 135, issue C, 2022

Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality pp. 1-15

John Hillas and Dov Samet

Issue linkage pp. 16-40

S. Currarini and C. Marchiori

Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation pp. 41-59

Yu Awaya and Jihwan Do

Can paying politicians well reduce corruption? The effects of wages and uncertainty on electoral competition pp. 60-73

Tom-Reiel Heggedal, Leif Helland and Rebecca Morton

On identifying subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes for timing games pp. 74-78

Jan-Henrik Steg

Information design in sequential procurement pp. 79-85

Nicolas Fugger, Vitali Gretschko and Martin Pollrich

Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy pp. 86-95

Carlo Prato and Stephane Wolton

The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies pp. 96-109

David Perez-Castrillo and Chaoran Sun

Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games pp. 110-131

Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Fabio Maccheroni and David Schmeidler

Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency pp. 132-143

Guido Merzoni and Federico Trombetta

Present bias in the labor market – when it pays to be naive pp. 144-167

Matthias Fahn and Regina Seibel

The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints pp. 168-187

Haris Aziz and Florian Brandl

The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings pp. 188-200

Agustín Bonifacio, Nadia Guiñazu, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme and Jorge Oviedo

Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games pp. 201-219

Anne-Christine Barthel, Eric Hoffmann and Tarun Sabarwal

Kuhn's equivalence theorem for games in product form pp. 220-240

Benjamin Heymann, Michel De Lara and Jean-Philippe Chancelier

The asymmetric effect of narratives on prosocial behavior pp. 241-270

Adrian Hillenbrand and Eugenio Verrina

Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform pp. 271-296

Masaki Aoyagi and Seung Han Yoo

Monitoring innovation pp. 297-326

Alexander Rodivilov

Equilibrium non-existence in generalized games pp. 327-337

Áron Tóbiás

Preferences and perceptions in Provision and Maintenance public goods pp. 338-355

Simon Gächter, Felix Kölle and Simone Quercia

Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results pp. 356-367

Rasoul Ramezanian and Mehdi Feizi

Projection bias in effort choices pp. 368-393

Marc Kaufmann

Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation pp. 394-410

Changxia Ke, Florian Morath, Anthony Newell and Lionel Page

The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism pp. 411-433

Inacio Bo and Rustamdjan Hakimov

Volume 134, issue C, 2022

Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest pp. 1-19

Francesc Dilme

When are groups less moral than individuals? pp. 20-36

Pol Campos-Mercade

Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation pp. 37-51

Zhiwei Cui and Fei Shi

Control, cost, and confidence: Perseverance and procrastination in the face of failure pp. 52-74

Inga Deimen and Julia Wirtz

Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks pp. 75-103

Edoardo Gallo, Yohanes Riyanto, Nilanjan Roy and Tat-How Teh

Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing pp. 104-116

Shuchi Chawla, Yifeng Teng and Christos Tzamos

Dynamic semi-consistency pp. 117-126

Sophie Bade

A variant of Harsanyi's tracing procedures to select a perfect equilibrium in normal form games pp. 127-150

Yiyin Cao and Chuangyin Dang

Limited perception and price discrimination in a model of horizontal product differentiation pp. 151-168

Marc P. Saur, Markus G. Schlatterer and Stefanie Y. Schmitt

Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes pp. 169-198

Ai Takeuchi, Róbert Veszteg, Yoshio Kamijo and Yukihiko Funaki

The secretary recommendation problem pp. 199-228

Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer and Rann Smorodinsky

Two-sided strategic information transmission pp. 229-241

Saori Chiba and Kazumi Hori

Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case pp. 242-263

Stéphan Sémirat and Françoise Forges

Simple equilibria in general contests pp. 264-280

Spencer Bastani, Thomas Giebe and Oliver Gürtler

The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation pp. 281-307

Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski and Noam Nisan

Learning in auctions: Regret is hard, envy is easy pp. 308-343

Constantinos Daskalakis and Vasilis Syrgkanis

Simple pricing schemes for consumers with evolving values pp. 344-360

Shuchi Chawla, Nikhil R. Devanur, Anna R. Karlin and Balasubramanian Sivan

Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets pp. 361-375

Krishnamurthy Dvijotham, Yuval Rabani and Leonard J. Schulman

Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria pp. 376-398

Yakov Babichenko and Aviad Rubinstein

On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design pp. 399-427

Christos Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos, Alexandros Psomas and Aviad Rubinstein

Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding pp. 428-448

Paul Dütting and Thomas Kesselheim

Volume 133, issue C, 2022

Expectations-based loss aversion in contests pp. 1-27

Qiang Fu, Youji Lyu, Zenan Wu and Yuanjie Zhang

Fair cake-cutting in practice pp. 28-49

Maria Kyropoulou, Josue Ortega and Erel Segal-Halevi

The evolution of conventions in the presence of social competition pp. 50-57

Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli

Varieties of risk preference elicitation pp. 58-76

Daniel Friedman, Sameh Habib, Duncan James and Brett Williams

Strategic transfers between cooperative games pp. 77-84

Caroline Berden, Hans Peters, Laura Robles and Dries Vermeulen

Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors pp. 85-108

Marieke Pahlke

Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value pp. 109-114

Manfred Besner

Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship pp. 115-125

Shunya Noda

Communication and cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games pp. 126-137

Eric Bahel, Sheryl Ball and Sudipta Sarangi

Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice pp. 138-149

Achille Basile, Surekha Rao and K.P.S. Bhaskara Rao

Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections pp. 150-161

Joseph McMurray

The influence of self and social image concerns on lying pp. 162-169

Zvonimir Bašić and Simone Quercia

Optimal attention management: A tractable framework pp. 170-180

Elliot Lipnowski, Laurent Mathevet and Dong Wei

Parallel markets in school choice pp. 181-201

Mustafa Oğuz Afacan, Piotr Evdokimov, Rustamdjan Hakimov and Bertan Turhan

Prize-linked savings games: Theory and experiment pp. 202-229

Paan Jindapon, Pacharasut Sujarittanonta and Ajalavat Viriyavipart

Listen before you link: Optimal monitoring rules for communication networks pp. 230-247

Shahir Safi

A characterization of proportionally representative committees pp. 248-255

Haris Aziz and Barton Lee

Auctions with flexible information acquisition pp. 256-281

Kyungmin Kim and Youngwoo Koh

Optimal stopping with behaviorally biased agents: The role of loss aversion and changing reference points pp. 282-299

Jon Kleinberg, Robert Kleinberg and Sigal Oren

Search equilibrium with unobservable investment pp. 300-330

Neel Rao

Adverse selection and contingent reasoning in preadolescents and teenagers pp. 331-351

Isabelle Brocas and Juan D. Carrillo