Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: An impossibility result

Wonki Jo Cho and William Thomson

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 142, issue C, 1012-1017

Abstract: We consider the problem of allocating a social endowment of private goods among a group of n agents with linear preferences. We search for rules that satisfy three standard requirements. First is (Pareto-)efficiency. Second is the fairness requirement of “equal treatment of equals” (in welfare terms). Third is the incentive requirement of “strategy-proofness”: no agent should ever benefit from misrepresenting their preferences. We show that no such rule exists. A variety of domains have been explored and similar negative results have been proved but one would have hoped that the domain of linear preferences is sufficiently narrow to allow for some positive results. Our result dashes such hopes.

Keywords: Linear preferences; Efficiency; Equal treatment of equals; Strategy-proofness; Impossibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:1012-1017

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.010

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