Order independence for rationalizability

Julien Manili

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 143, issue C, 152-160

Abstract: This paper provides a sufficient monotonicity condition for the solution of a rationalizability procedure to be independent of the order of elimination. The analysis unfolds in an abstract environment that applies to any game and elimination procedure. Monotonicity is satisfied by rationalizability procedures based on monotone belief operators, such as “directed” rationalizability, interim correlated rationalizability, or, in sequential games, initial and backwards rationalizability.

Keywords: Rationalizability; Order independence; Iterated elimination procedure; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:143:y:2024:i:c:p:152-160

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.013

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