Voting with interdependent values: The Condorcet winner

Alex Gershkov, Andreas Kleiner, Benny Moldovanu and Xianwen Shi

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 142, issue C, 193-208

Abstract: We generalize the standard, private values voting model with single-peaked preferences and incomplete information by introducing interdependent preferences. Our main results show how standard mechanisms that are outcome-equivalent and implement the Condorcet winner under complete information or under private values yield starkly different outcomes if values are interdependent. We also propose a new notion of Condorcet winner under incomplete information and interdependent preferences, and discuss its implementation. The new phenomena in this paper arise because different voting rules (including dynamic ones) induce different processes of information aggregation and learning.

Keywords: Sequential voting; Interdependent values; Incomplete information; Condorcet winner (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Voting with Interdependent Values: The Condorcet Winner (2023)
Working Paper: Voting With Interdependent Values: The Condorcet Winner (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:193-208

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.004

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