Voting With Interdependent Values: The Condorcet Winner

Alex Gershkov (), Andreas Kleiner (), Benny Moldovanu () and Xianwen Shi

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: We generalize the standard, private values voting model with single-peaked preferences and incomplete information by introducing interdependent preferences. Our main results show how standard mechanisms that are outcome-equivalent and implement the Con- dorcet winner under complete information or under private values yield starkly di¤erent outcomes if values are interdependent. We also propose a new notion of Condorcet winner under incomplete information and interdependent preferences, and discuss its implemen- tation. The new phenomena in this paper arise because di¤erent voting rules (including dynamic ones) induce di¤erent processes of information aggregation and learning.

Keywords: Voting; interdependent values; Condorcet winner (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2023-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Voting with interdependent values: The Condorcet winner (2023)
Working Paper: Voting with Interdependent Values: The Condorcet Winner (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2023_414

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