Voting with Interdependent Values: The Condorcet Winner

Alex Gershkov, Andreas Kleiner, Benny Moldovanu and Xianwen Shi
Additional contact information
Alex Gershkov: Department of Economics, Hebrew University Jerusalem and School of Economics, University of Surrey
Andreas Kleiner: Department of Economics, Arizona State University
Benny Moldovanu: Department of Economics, University of Bonn

No 243, ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series from University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany

Abstract: We generalize the standard, private values voting model with single-peaked preferences and incomplete information by introducing interdependent preferences. Our main results show how standard mechanisms that are outcome-equivalent and implement the Condorcet winner under complete information or under private values yield starkly different outcomes if values are interdependent. We also propose a new notion of Condorcet winner under incomplete information and interdependent preferences, and discuss its implementation. The new phenomena in this paper arise because diffrent voting rules (including dynamic ones) induce different processes of information aggregation and learning.

Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2023-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
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https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkdps/ECONtribute_243_2023.pdf First version, 2023 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Voting with interdependent values: The Condorcet winner (2023)
Working Paper: Voting With Interdependent Values: The Condorcet Winner (2023)
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