School choice with transferable student characteristics

Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez () and Antonio Romero-Medina
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 143, issue C, 103-124

Abstract: We consider school choice problems where school priorities depend on transferable student characteristics. Fair Pareto improvements can alleviate the trade-off between efficiency and stability in this framework. A group of students may improve their outcomes by exchanging their seats and transferable characteristics at the schools they are initially assigned without generating justified envy among the remaining students.

Keywords: School choice; Transferable characteristics; Priorities; Constrained efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825623001793
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: School Choice with Transferable Students Characteristics (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:143:y:2024:i:c:p:103-124

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.007

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().