Submission costs in risk-taking contests

Mark Whitmeyer

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 142, issue C, 101-112

Abstract: This paper investigates stochastic continuous time contests with a twist: the designer requires that contest participants incur some cost to submit their entries. When the designer wishes to maximize the (expected) performance of the top performer, a strictly positive submission cost is optimal. When the designer wishes to maximize total (expected) performance, either the highest submission cost or the lowest submission cost is optimal.

Keywords: All-pay contests; Stochastic contests; Rank-order selection; Optimal stopping; Submission costs; Bayesian persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D81 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825623001070
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:101-112

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.014

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().