Signal-jamming in the frequency domain

B. Taub

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 142, issue C, 896-930

Abstract: I examine strategic behavior for a duopoly in a noisy environment. Firms attempt to learn the value of the rival's privately observed demand shocks via a noisy signal of price, and at the same time firms attempt to obfuscate that signal by producing excess output on the publicly observable signals, that is, they signal jam.

Keywords: Dynamic games; Signal jamming; Strategic information; Frequency-domain methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:896-930

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.006

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