Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules

R. Pablo Arribillaga and Agustín Bonifacio

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 143, issue C, 12-24

Abstract: In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. First, we show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in the top.

Keywords: Obvious manipulations; Tops-onliness; (Generalized) median voting schemes; Voting by committees; Voting by quota (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules (2022)
Working Paper: Obvious Manipulations of tops-only Voting Rules (2022)
Working Paper: Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:143:y:2024:i:c:p:12-24

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.002

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