Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules

R. Pablo Arribillaga and Agustín Bonifacio

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. First, we show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in the top. Second, we focus on two classes of tops-only rules: (i) (generalized) median voter schemes, and (ii) voting by committees. For each class, we identify which rules do not have obvious manipulations on the universal domain of preferences.

Date: 2022-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2210.11627 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules (2024)
Working Paper: Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules (2022)
Working Paper: Obvious Manipulations of tops-only Voting Rules (2022)
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