Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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One-Shot Public Mediated Talk pp. 131-148: Ehud Lehrer and Sylvain Sorin
Risk-Sensitive Dynamic Market Share Attraction Games pp. 149-160: George E. Monahan and Matthew J. Sobel
Balanced Contributions Axiom in the Solution of Cooperative Games pp. 161-168: Francisco Sanchez S.
Games of Manipulation in Marriage Problems pp. 169-176: Tayfun Sönmez
Learning from Others: A Welfare Analysis pp. 177-200: Xavier Vives
Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities pp. 201-237: Sang-Seung Yi
Pure-Strategy [epsiv]-Nash Equilibrium inn-Person Nonzero-Sum Discontinuous Games pp. 238-249: Abderrahmane Ziad

On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall pp. 3-24: Michele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein
A Comment on the Absent-Minded Driver Paradox pp. 25-30: Itzhak Gilboa
Dynamic Consistency and Imperfect Recall pp. 31-50: Pierpaolo Battigalli
On the Expected Value of Games with Absentmindedness pp. 51-65: Adam J. Grove and Joseph Halpern
On Ambiguities in the Interpretation of Game Trees pp. 66-96: Joseph Halpern
More Absentmindedness pp. 97-101: Barton Lipman
The Absent-Minded Driver pp. 102-116: Robert Aumann, Sergiu Hart and Motty Perry
The Forgetful Passenger pp. 117-120: Robert Aumann, Sergiu Hart and Motty Perry
The Absent-Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses pp. 121-130: Michele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein

Multilateral Bargaining Problems pp. 151-179: Elaine Bennett
Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia pp. 180-210: Glenn Ellison
Coalitional Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers pp. 211-220: Robert Evans
On the Relationship between Risk-Dominance and Stochastic Stability pp. 221-234: Toshimasa Maruta
A Characterization of Ordinal Potential Games pp. 235-242: Mark Voorneveld and Henk Norde
Elaine Bennett pp. 243-248: Michael Maschler

The Variable Frame Theory of Focal Points: An Experimental Study pp. 1-45: Michael Bacharach and Michele Bernasconi
Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results pp. 46-76: Yin-Wong Cheung and Daniel Friedman
An Experimental Study of Time-Independent and Time-Dependent Externalities in the Commons pp. 77-96: Andrew Herr, Roy Gardner and James Walker
Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games pp. 97-132: Dilip Mookherjee and Barry Sopher
Common Belief of Rationality in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma pp. 133-143: Harborne Stuart
A Comment on Issue-by-Issue Negotiations pp. 144-148: Lutz-Alexander Busch and Ignatius Horstmann

Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games pp. 141-158: Martin Cripps and Jonathan Thomas
A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information pp. 159-175: Francoise Forges and Enrico Minelli
An Optimal Auction for Complements pp. 176-192: Jonathan Levin
How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? pp. 193-218: George Mailath, Larry Samuelson and Jeroen Swinkels
Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance pp. 219-245: Leslie Marx and Jeroen Swinkels
Sequentially Optimal Auctions pp. 246-276: Randolph McAfee and Daniel Vincent
An Axiomatization of Nash Equilibria in Economic Situations pp. 277-285: Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudhölter
Learning to Learn, Pattern Recognition, and Nash Equilibrium pp. 286-331: Doron Sonsino

Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules pp. 1-21: Salvador Barberà, Matthew Jackson and Alejandro Neme
The Multilinear Extension of the Quotient Game pp. 22-31: F. Carreras and A. Magana
Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach pp. 32-54: Hsiao-Chi Chen, James Friedman and Jacques Thisse
A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules pp. 55-72: Nir Dagan, Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij
Commonp-Belief: The General Case pp. 73-82: Atsushi Kajii and Stephen Morris
Cooperative Games with Hedonic Coalitions pp. 83-97: Laurence Kranich
Undominated Equilibria in Games with Strategic Complementarities pp. 98-115: Klaus Kultti and Hannu Salonen
Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information pp. 116-134: Ehud Lehrer and Rann Smorodinsky
On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games pp. 135-140: Ferenc Szidarovszky and Koji Okuguchi

Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Procurement Contracting pp. 147-176: James Cox, R. Mark Isacc, Paula-Ann Cech and David Conn
Markov Equilibria of Stochastic Games with Complementarities pp. 177-199: Laurent O. Curtat
Cooperative Production: A Comparison of Welfare Bounds pp. 200-208: Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet
A Spatial Theory of Positive and Negative Campaigning pp. 209-229: Joseph Harrington and Gregory Hess
Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information pp. 230-251: Dov Samet

Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies pp. 1-31: Vijay Krishna and Robert Rosenthal
Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values pp. 32-55: Robert Rosenthal and Ruqu Wang
Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium: A Definition pp. 56-79: Indrajit Ray
Coalition-Proof Equilibrium pp. 80-112: Diego Moreno and John Wooders
Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities pp. 113-128: Paul Milgrom and John Roberts
On the Computation of Randomized Markov Equilibria pp. 129-134: Olivier Cadot and Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné
A Note on Backward Induction pp. 135-137: Ken Binmore
Reply to Binmore pp. 138-146: Robert Aumann