Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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Volume 132, issue C, 2022

Towards a taxonomy of learning dynamics in 2 × 2 games pp. 1-21

Marco Pangallo, James B.T. Sanders, Tobias Galla and J. Farmer

Do people maximize quantiles? pp. 22-40

Luciano de Castro, Antonio Galvao, Charles Noussair and Liang Qiao

Statistical discrimination and affirmative action in the lab pp. 41-58

Ahrash Dianat, Federico Echenique and Leeat Yariv

Social proximity and the erosion of norm compliance pp. 59-72

Cristina Bicchieri, Eugen Dimant, Simon Gächter and Daniele Nosenzo

Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects pp. 73-89

Patrick Harless and William Phan

Fairness and risk in ultimatum bargaining pp. 90-105

Kyle Hyndman and Matthew Walker

Market screening with limited records pp. 106-132

Ayça Kaya and Santanu Roy

A dynamic theory of spatial externalities pp. 133-165

Raouf Boucekkine, Giorgio Fabbri, Salvatore Federico and Fausto Gozzi

Limited Foresight Equilibrium pp. 166-188

Jeevant Rampal

Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions pp. 189-203

Benjamin Rosa

On incentive-compatible estimators pp. 204-220

Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler

Social learning in nonatomic routing games pp. 221-233

Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini and Tristan Tomala

Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices pp. 234-239

Rene Kirkegaard

Delegated expertise: Implementability with peer-monitoring pp. 240-254

Yaron Azrieli

Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets pp. 255-273

Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme and Jorge Oviedo

Equilibrium player choices in team contests with multiple pairwise battles pp. 274-287

Hideo Konishi, Chen-Yu Pan and Dimitar Simeonov

Cheap talk with private signal structures pp. 288-304

Maxim Ivanov and Alex Sam

On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games pp. 305-315

Bin Wu

Local public goods with weighted link formation pp. 316-327

Markus Kinateder and Luca Merlino

The order of presentation in trials: Plaintive plaintiffs pp. 328-336

Elena D'Agostino and Daniel Seidmann

Winner-leave versus loser-leave in multi-stage nested Tullock contests pp. 337-352

Jingfeng Lu, Yuanzhu Lu, Zhewei Wang and Lixue Zhou

Stable cores in information graph games pp. 353-367

Marina Núñez and Juan Vidal-Puga

Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities pp. 368-379

Yusuke Iwase, Shoya Tsuruta and Akina Yoshimura

Voting on tricky questions pp. 380-389

Tomoya Tajika

The impossibility of agreeing to disagree: An extension of the sure-thing principle pp. 390-399

Dov Samet

College admissions with tuition transfers pp. 400-420

Mustafa Oğuz Afacan

Dominant firm and competitive bundling in oligopoly markets pp. 421-447

Jie Shuai, Huanxing Yang and Lan Zhang

Invariant equilibria and classes of equivalent games pp. 448-462

Blake A. Allison, Adib Bagh and Jason J. Lepore

Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation pp. 463-477

Armando Gomes

The general graph matching game: Approximate core pp. 478-486

Vijay V. Vazirani

Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium pp. 487-509

Simon Grant and Ronald Stauber

Affirmative action in the presence of income heterogeneity pp. 510-533

Brishti Guha and Prabal Roy Chowdhury

Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity pp. 534-552

Swagata Bhattacharjee

Robust coalitional implementation pp. 553-575

Huiyi Guo and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Inductive inference with incompleteness pp. 576-591

Shiri Alon, Gilad Bavly and Gabrielle Gayer

Informational robustness of common belief in rationality pp. 592-597

Gabriel Ziegler

Volume 131, issue C, 2022

Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models pp. 1-28

Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno

Idiosyncratic preferences in games on networks pp. 29-50

Olena Orlova

The Trembling Chairman Paradox pp. 51-56

Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Price discovery using a double auction pp. 57-83

Mark A. Satterthwaite, Steven R. Williams and Konstantinos Zachariadis

Dynamic mechanism design on social networks pp. 84-120

Dawen Meng, Lei Sun and Guoqiang Tian

Social norms and preferences for generosity are domain dependent pp. 121-140

Hande Erkut

Best response dynamics on random graphs pp. 141-170

Jordan Chellig, Calina Durbac and Nikolaos Fountoulakis

The absence of attrition in a war of attrition under complete information pp. 171-185

George Georgiadis, Youngsoo Kim and H. Dharma Kwon

The welfare costs of informationally efficient prices pp. 186-196

Moran Koren and Manuel Mueller-Frank

Almost envy-free allocations with connected bundles pp. 197-221

Vittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Michele Flammini, Ayumi Igarashi, Gianpiero Monaco, Dominik Peters, Cosimo Vinci and William S. Zwicker

How to add apples and oranges: Aggregating performances of different nature pp. 222-244

Wonki Cho

Information manipulation and competition pp. 245-263

Andreas Grunewald and Matthias Kräkel

A note on topological aspects in dynamic games of resource extraction and economic growth theory pp. 264-274

Anna Jaśkiewicz and Andrzej Nowak

Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing pp. 275-291

Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro and Gabriel Weintraub