A characterization of proportionally representative committees

Haris Aziz and Barton Lee

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 133, issue C, 248-255

Abstract: A well-known axiom for proportional representation is Proportionality for Solid Coalitions (PSC). We characterize committees satisfying PSC as the range of outcomes obtained by the class of Minimal Demand rules, which generalizes an approach pioneered by eminent philosopher Sir Michael Dummett.

Keywords: Committee selection; Multi-winner voting; Proportional representation; Single transferable vote (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C63 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: A characterization of proportionally representative committees (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:133:y:2022:i:c:p:248-255

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.006

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