Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections

Joseph McMurray ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 133, issue C, 150-161

Abstract: Adding candidates to a one-dimensional common-interest voting model, this paper shows that catering to centrist voters can lower social welfare. The electoral benefit of doing so is weak, so candidates polarize substantially in equilibrium, resolving a long-standing empirical puzzle.

Keywords: Polarization; Pandering; Information aggregation; Jury theorem; Median voter; Common interest; Competition; Elections; Ideology; Public opinion; Voting; Epistemic democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:133:y:2022:i:c:p:150-161

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.028

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