 Bandwagon effects and constrained network formationZhiwei Cui and Fei Shi Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 134, issue C, 37-51 Abstract: We consider a model where players can actively form a limited number of links with other players to play a general class of size-dependent coordination games. This class of games includes multi-person binary action coordination games, minimum effort games, average opinion games, and others, and it is mainly characterized by strategic complementarities among actions. Whenever players may only support links to a relatively small number of other players, the most efficient convention will be selected, irrespective of the details of the size-dependent coordination games. When the linking constraint becomes less restrictive, the most efficient convention will still be selected, provided that the most efficient action delivers a relatively high output when played against a small group also using it. Furthermore, for the special case of size-dependent minimum effort games, the second most efficient convention may be selected. Keywords: Bandwagon effects; Coordination games; Learning; Network formation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:134:y:2022:i:c:p:37-51 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.014 Access Statistics for this article Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier |
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