Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value
Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 133, issue C, 109-114
Central to this note is the concept of disjointly productive players. Two players are disjointly productive if there is no synergy effect if one of these players joins a coalition containing the other. Our first new axiom states that the payoff to a player does not change when another player, disjointly productive in relation to that player, leaves the game. The second new axiom implies that if a player splits into two disjointly productive players who together contribute the same to the game as the original player, the payoff to another player does not change. These two axioms, along with efficiency, characterize the Shapley value.
Keywords: Cooperative game; Shapley value; Disjointly productive players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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