Preferences and perceptions in Provision and Maintenance public goods

Simon Gächter, Felix Kölle and Simone Quercia

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 135, issue C, 338-355

Abstract: We study two generic versions of public goods problems: in Provision problems, the public good does not exist initially and needs to be provided; in Maintenance problems, the public good already exists and needs to be maintained. In four lab and online experiments (n=2,105), we document a robust asymmetry in preferences and perceptions in two incentive-equivalent versions of these public good problems. We find fewer conditional cooperators and more free riders in Maintenance than Provision, a difference that is replicable, stable, and reflected in perceptions of kindness. Incentivized control questions administered before gameplay reveal dilemma-specific misperceptions but controlling for them neither eliminates game-dependent conditional cooperation, nor differences in perceived kindness of others' cooperation. Thus, even when sharing the same game form, Maintenance and Provision are different social dilemmas that require separate behavioral analyses.

Keywords: Maintenance and provision social dilemmas; Conditional cooperation; Kindness; Misperceptions; Experiments; Framing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: Preferences and Perceptions in Provision and Maintenance Public Goods (2022)
Working Paper: Preferences and Perceptions in Provision and Maintenance Public Goods (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:135:y:2022:i:c:p:338-355

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.009

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