Optimal attention management: A tractable framework

Elliot Lipnowski, Laurent Mathevet and Dong Wei

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 133, issue C, 170-180

Abstract: A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever information the principal makes available, the agent may choose to ignore some. We study optimal information provision in a tractable model with quadratic payoffs where full disclosure is not optimal. We characterize incentive-compatible information policies, that is, those to which the agent willingly pays full attention. In a leading example with three states, optimal disclosure involves information distortion at intermediate costs of attention. As the cost increases, optimal information changes from downplaying the state to exaggerating the state.

Keywords: Information disclosure; Rational inattention; Costly information processing; Paternalistic information design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Working Paper: Optimal Attention Management: A Tractable Framework (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:133:y:2022:i:c:p:170-180

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.029

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