Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games

Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Fabio Maccheroni and David Schmeidler

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 135, issue C, 110-131

Abstract: We define a new notion of equilibrium for nonatomic anonymous games, termed ε-estimated equilibrium, and prove its existence for any positive ε. This notion encompasses and brings to nonatomic games recent concepts of equilibrium such as self-confirming, peer-confirming, and Berk-Nash. This augmented scope is our main motivation. Our approach also resolves some conceptual problems present in Schmeidler (1973), pointed out by Shapley.

Keywords: Nonatomic games; Large games; Nash equilibrium; Self-confirming equilibrium; Peer-confirming equilibrium; Berk-Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825622000902
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games (2020)
Working Paper: Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:135:y:2022:i:c:p:110-131

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.011

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().