# Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games

*Simone Cerreia-Vioglio*,
*Fabio Maccheroni* and
*David Schmeidler*

No 656, Working Papers from IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University

**Abstract:**
We add here another layer to the literature on nonatomic anonymous games started with the 1973 paper by Schmeidler. More specifically, we define a new notion of equilibrium which we call "-estimated equilibrium and prove its existence for any positive ". This notion encompasses and brings to nonatomic games recent concepts of equilibrium such as self-confirming, peer-confirming, and Berk-Nash. This augmented scope is our main motivation. At the same time, our approach also resolves some conceptual problems present in Schmeidler (1973), pointed out by Shapley. In that paper the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria has been proved for any nonatomic game with a continuum of players, endowed with an atomless countably additive probability. But, requiring Borel measurability of strategy profiles may impose some limitation on playersâ€™ choices and introduce an exogenous dependence among playersâ€™ actions, which clashes with the nature of noncooperative game theory. Our suggested solution is to consider every suset of players as measurable. This leads to a nontrivial purely finitely additive component which might prevent the existence of equilibria and requires a novel mathematical approach to prove the existence of "-equilibria.

**Date:** 2019

**New Economics Papers:** this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic

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