The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings

Agustín Bonifacio, Nadia Guiñazu, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme and Jorge Oviedo

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 135, issue C, 188-200

Abstract: In a many-to-one matching model, we study the set of worker-quasi-stable matchings when firms' choice functions satisfy substitutability. Worker-quasi-stability is a relaxation of stability that allows blocking pairs involving a firm and an unemployed worker. We show that this set has a lattice structure and define a Tarski operator on this lattice that models a re-equilibration process and has the set of stable matchings as its fixed points.

Keywords: Matching; Worker-quasi-stability; Lattice; Tarski operator; Re-equilibration process (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Working Paper: The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings (2022)
Working Paper: The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings (2021)
Working Paper: The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:135:y:2022:i:c:p:188-200

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.004

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